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1. Introduction
Several countries have in the last decade implemented tax reforms to increase
the incentives to work and save and to decrease the incentives of tax avoidance and activities
in the ”black” economy. Sweden is one of them. The progressivity of the Swedish income tax
system was at its peak in the first half of the 1980s. Gradual decreases in the marginal tax
rates then followed with the major steps taken in 1990 and 1991. Figure 1 shows the marginal
tax rates by tax assessed income in constant Swedish crowns for 1985, 1990 and 1992.
1 The
decrease in the tax rates is so large that one might expect observable adjustment effects as a
result of these changes. The 1990/91 reform was preceded by extensive studies in a
government commission. There were among others two issues, which were much discussed
inside and outside the commission, namely the distributional issue and the size of any
behavioral adjustments, in particular in the supply of labor.
Labor supply studies done for the government commission suggested that the substitution
effects of the marginal tax changes were not negligible (see Reformerad Inkomstbeskattning,
1989). Although the 1990/91 reform was designed to become almost revenue neutral these
results were a partial motive not to fund it fully. There were, however, also critical voices
raising doubts about the size of any labor supply effects and suggesting that the labor supply
studies were interpreted in an overly optimistic way (Flood & Klevmarken (1990), see also
Björklund(1995) and his reference to the proceedings of the Swedish Economic Association
1988).
The Swedish Parliament allocated funds for an evaluation of the effects of the 1990/91 tax
reform and the task was given to a government commission (KUSK) which contracted out
part of the scientific evaluation to a group of economists. In their report (Agell, et.al., 1995)
they conclude that the tax reform might have generated an increased supply of hours for
married and cohabiting men in the order of 5 per cent or somewhat less, while the expected
effect for married or cohabiting women probably is close to zero. For singles there are no
results. (Agell et.al 1995, p. 143) With the exception of a preliminary version of the current
study (Klevmarken et.al., 1995 section 4.4) these conclusions were entirely based on studies
only using data from the period before the 1990/91 tax reform and in one case even cross-
sectional data from 1980 (Aronsson & Palme, 1994).
After the tax reforms have been implemented we should now take advantage of the interesting
experimental situation these reforms have given and use data collected both before and after
the reforms. A defense for only using pre reform data is that Sweden entered its deepest
recession since the 1930s immediately after the 1990/91 reform and that it will become
difficult to separate the effects of the tax reforms on labor supply from other effects. This
difficulty should, however not prevent us from supplementing previous studies with pre-post
studies to better answer the question: Did the tax reform influence labor supply? This paper
tries to answer this question using panel data for a random sample of Swedes collected in
1986 and 1993. Although it would be possible to estimate a conventional labor supply model
assuming that each individual chooses consumption and leisure to maximize utility, we take a
more agnostic approach in a statistical analysis of observed changes in hours worked.
                                                
1 In 1992 labor incomes and incomes of capital were no longer jointly taxed. The curve for 1992 is a function of
assessed labor income only.3
Consequently, any welfare related conclusions are beyond the scope of this paper. The aim is
only to investigate if the tax reforms made people work more (or less).4
2. Previous experiences, theory and outline of the study.
Labor supply studies using Swedish data have recently been surveyed in
Gustafsson & Klevmarken(1993) and in Aronsson, Heckman & Walker(1994). Like the
international literature on labor supply the Swedish literature also give evidence of a diversity
of results. Many of the most influential studies on Swedish data have, however, been made in
the same approach as once suggested by Hausman and using one single cross-section of data,
the 1980/81 LNU-wave. This perhaps explains why a certain consensus seems to have
emerged among Swedish economists as to the magnitudes of labor supply elasticities, which is
reflected in the summary and evaluation of empirical results in Agell et.al.(1995).
2 For prime
aged married men they found that estimated income elasticities were in the range of -0.1 and 0
and compensated  wage rate elasticities in the range of 0.08 to 0.24 with a concentration
around 0.1. For women the range of results was wider. Income elasticities were found between
-0.03 and -0.24 and compensated wage rate elasticities between 0.22 and 1.07.
There were two studies commissioned by KUSK, which are of particular interest. One is
Aronsson & Palme (1994) because they estimated a household model taking into account the
interaction between the two spouses. They assumed that a myopic quadratic utility function of
the husband’s and wife’s work hours is maximized subject to a budget constraint for the
household. The model was estimated by the maximum likelihood method. They found income
elasticities close to zero (0.01 for men and -0.06 for women) and an own-price elasticity for
men of 0.15 and a cross price elasticity close to zero. For women the own price elasticity was
0.31 but the cross price elasticity was -0.1. This implies that the decrease in marginal tax rate
experienced by men after the 1990/91 tax reform, which was large compared to that of
women, reduced the labor supply of women. The net effect simulated by the authors showed
almost no change in annual hours of work for women. Men increased their hours 5-8 per cent
depending on base year for the comparison.
Another interesting study is that of Ackum Agell & Meghir(1995) because this is the only
study based on a long panel of Swedish micro data. They estimated both a life cycle model
and a more conventional ”within period” model of labor supply. The estimated equation was
in the form of a log-change equation in hours of work. Their data covered male blue-collar
workers from the Swedish engineering industry. The results were low elasticities in the same
range as previous Swedish studies, and they concluded that the tax reform is unlikely to have
had large incentive effects on hours worked by males.
In the international literature we have only been able to find two studies, Eissa(1995) and
Mariger(1995) which uses panel data before and after a tax reform to evaluate its effects on
labor supply. In both studies the object of the analysis is the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the
United States. Compared to the Swedish 1990/91 reform the US tax reform involved smaller
decreases in the marginal rates in particular for people below the highest income brackets, and
the decreases also started from a lower level. For people with the highest incomes the
marginal tax rate decreased from 50 percent to 28 percent in the US and from 80 per cent to
50 per cent in Sweden. The analysis of Eissa (1995) is limited to the work behavior of married
women at or above the 99th percentile of the income distribution. This choice is guided by the
                                                
2Although elasticities are model based concepts and do not exist independently of a model, and usually depend
on a number of variables and thus vary to their magnitude from one individual to another, it is very common to
try to assess ”the” value of an elasticity.5
fact the marginal tax rates were lowered much more for high-income individuals than for
those further down the income distribution and that married women are believed to be more
responsive to tax changes than other groups. A difference-in-difference technique was used to
measure work responses to the 1986 tax changes. To control for changes in work caused by
other factors than the tax reform women at the 75th (90th) percentile of the income
distribution were used as control group. The impact of the tax reform was thus identified as
the difference between the change in labor supply of women from high-income families
(treatment groups) and the change in labor supply of women from the 75th percentile (control
group). Income was defined as the sum of the husband’s labor income and any nonlabor
income received by the family. It was thus assumed that the wife conditions her participation
and hours decisions on her spouse’s labor supply decision. A regression framework was also
used to hold variables like age, education, family size etc. constant.
The results, based on CPS data, indicate that women from high-income families did adjust
their work according to the tax reform. The elasticity of total labor supply with respect to
after-tax wage was approximately estimated to 0.8 and the participation elasticity to 0.4. It is
also of some interest to note that for these high-income women ”the participation decision is
only slightly more sensitive to taxes than the hours decisions”.
In the Mariger (1995) paper a life-cycle model was assumed which resulted in an estimated
relation in which the log-change of leisure depended on marginal and average tax changes,
changes in the gross wages, education, age, number of children and a regional unemployment
rate. Separate relations were estimated for males and females. The data used came from the
nonpoverty sample of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They were limited to families
headed by the same married couple between 1985 and 1988 and only included individuals
working an average of at least 10 hours per week in each year between 1985 and 1988. The
estimates of the effects of the tax changes were close to zero and insignificant. The point
estimates implied that the tax reform increased total hours worked about 1 percent for men
and about 0.3 percent for women. Using a confidence interval the author concluded ”that the
tax reform is 95 percent certain to have increased hours worked by no more than 2 percent in
1988”.
As a general observation we note that the now numerous studies of the incentive effects on
labor supply of tax changes have given a variety of results depending on model specification,
data and econometric methods used. We have learned that modeling labor supply behavior is a
much more complex endeavor than most early analysts realized. There are severe problems of
obtaining good and reliable measures of the key variables: hours worked, wage rate and
incomes (c.f. for instance Duncan & Hill (1985) and Andersson et.al. (1993)). With most
current data sets it is difficult to get a good representation of the budget sets even within a
static model. The tax legislation and the transfer systems of most Western countries are so
complex that the data sources available for research normally do not have all the information
needed to compute correct budget sets. The most severe difficulty is, however, to obtain a
realistic model representation of the very complex processes of labor supply. The relatively
simple, usually static models, which have been used in most empirical studies, impose too
much structure on data. There is a risk that the a priori assumed model structure will have a
decisive influence on the estimated price and income effects.
The approach taken in this paper is not that of estimating the structural parameters of an
economic model but rather that of using the analogy of a statistical experiment. This implies6
looking upon the tax changes as a quasi experiment to which the taxpayers are exposed and
try to assess the outcome of this experiment, as measured by the change in annual hours of
work, in a statistical analysis.
Those who have experienced the largest changes in marginal taxes might also be expected to
adjust their hours of work the most. By grouping a sample of tax payers by the size of the
change in marginal tax rate and compute the average change in hours worked for each group
we might be able to average out confounding effects on hours of work and estimate the effects
of tax changes. A little reflection shows, however, that the analogy with a statistical
experiment is far from perfect. It is relatively easy to find confounding factors which need to
be controlled. Although we do not claim to estimate a structured economic model, economic
theory is useful in guiding the analysis of work behavior and suggesting control variables. In a
standard life cycle labor supply model in which a time-separable utility function of
consumption and leisure is maximized subject to a budget constraint, it can be shown that the
change in labor supply is a function of the change in the gross wage rate, the marginal tax rate
and nonlabor income, and in any taste shifters. This very simple model, however, neglects
important aspects of behavior, for instance, that decisions about work and leisure are joint
family decisions and not independent decisions of each individual, that the formulation of the
budget set is a simplification and that there are no reasons to believe people to have full
knowledge of their budget sets
3. Furthermore, hours worked are not at the complete discretion
of the worker, because there are both institutional restrictions as to hours of work and general
demand variations. In the following the 1986 and 1993 waves of Swedish HUS data will be
used in a multivariate difference-in-difference approach to assess any effects on hours worked
of the 1990/91 tax reform. First follows a discussion of data and variables used.
3. Data, population and variable definitions
Data were obtained from the longitudinal survey ”Household Market and
Nonmarket Activities (HUS), see Klevmarken & Olovsson (1993). The first wave of data was
collected in 1984 for a random sample of Swedish speaking individuals living in Sweden.
This sample has since then been reinterviewed almost every second year and supplementary
samples have been added to the study. In this paper we will only use data from the two waves
of 1986 and 1993. They were relatively large waves including enough variables to compute
good budget sets and they were also similar in design. The smaller waves of 1988 and 1991 in
which data were primarily collected in postal questionnaires and not by telephone or in
personal interviews do not include all the information needed to compute good marginal tax
rates. The implication of only using the 1986 and 1993 waves is that we will not be able to
isolate the effects of the 1990/91 tax reform, but on the other hand we might be able to capture
any lagged reactions to the early adjustments of the tax system in the period 1985 - 1992.
Most Swedes who have not already retired before the age of 65 will do so at this age. For
many employees 65 is a mandatory retirement age. For this reason everyone who were 58 or
older in 1985 and thus became 65 no later than 1992 were excluded from our study. With this
exception none was excluded from the population on the basis of industry, schooling, region,
etc. Self-employed are thus included but the share of self-employed is very small.
                                                
3 For an empirical verification of this statement see Wahlund(1987) and Klevmarken et.al.(1995)7
Table 1 gives a few details about sample size by gender and labor force participation in 1985
and 1992. In all, the survey includes 1147 men and 1205 women who were below the age of
58 in 1985 but many of these respondents had dropped out of the panel by 1992. In some
cases they did so because they died or left the country or joined an institution but in most
cases because they did not want to participate or could not be found. In our analysis we will
have to compensate for this attrition. There were 559 men and 504 women who worked both
years. Some of these will drop out during the course of the analysis because there is partial
nonresponse in some of the explanatory variables. Because the Swedish labor force
participation rate is rather high for both gender, the number of individuals who did not work at
all was relatively small both years which makes an analysis of transitions between work and
no work difficult. The focus of our analysis is thus on those who worked in the market both
years, a constraint, which also may cause sample selectivity.
In the following a brief description is given of the variables used in this paper. A more
detailed account of variable definitions and measurement approaches is given in Appendix A.
The ”dependent” variable in this study is the (log) change in annual hours of work and it
includes hours both at the main job and at any secondary job. It also includes vacations,
sickleave and other leave from work up to eight weeks. Table 2 gives a few summary
statistics. The median change in hours is zero for males and almost zero for women. The
means suggest a 4 percent increase for men and 17 percent for women which implies that the
right tail of the distribution is somewhat more elongated than the left tail. The skewness of
these distributions is, however, very small.  The higher increase for women starts from a lower
level. On average sample women worked 1482 hours in 1985 while men worked 2037 hours.
The ”design variable” is the change in marginal tax rate. It was calculated on the basis of
incomes received in 1985. We thus compared the marginal tax rate an individual would have
had if the 1992 tax system had been enforced already in 1985, with the marginal tax rate
obtained with the 1985 tax system. As the income definitions, tax bases, thresholds and rules
for deductions and exemptions changed these computations are not straightforward. The
assumptions used are detailed in Appendix. These marginal tax rate changes only result from
changes in the income tax system. They do not include any changes in income dependent
benefits nor the increase in indirect taxes. For most purposes the change in the marginal tax
rate has been dichotomized. Two dummy variables were defined, one (D1) takes the value 1
when the decrease in the marginal tax rate exceeded 20 percentage units and the other (D2)
takes the value one when the decrease exceeded 7 but not 20 percentage units.
Table 2 shows that in our sample of working men and women the marginal tax rate on average
decreased by 14 per cent. The 10th percentile was - 25 per cent. There were very small gender
differences in the changes. The gender differences in levels were also small. In 1985 the
average marginal tax rate was 50.9 per cent for males and 45.2 per cent for female. The
explanation is of course that the sample is limited to those who worked in both years.
One of our explanatory variables is the log-change in the hourly wage rate. The hourly wage
rate can be estimated in two different ways. One alternative is to divide the sum of all labor
incomes with an estimate of the annual hours of work. The other alternative is to use survey
questions on pay combined with information on average weekly working hours at the time of
the interview. The former estimates can be obtained for 1985 and 1992, i.e. the same years for
which we have observations on annual work hours. The latter estimates are only available for8
1986 and 1993. For this reason the survey-based estimates are less useful to explain the
change in hours 1985-1992, but they will be used as instruments in the subsequent analysis.
Nonlabor income is the sum of income from capital, accrued capital gains and losses and
nonwork related benefits. For households with two spouses the variable is defined as the sum
of each spouse’s nonlabor income. We also experimented with adding the labor income of the
respondent’s spouse to the household’s nonlabor income. Both wage rates and incomes were
deflated by the CPI.
A few demographic ”taste shifters” were also used, mostly in the form of dummy variables.
One is a variable which indicates if the respondent separated from a partner in the period
1985-1992 . For women, in particular, a separation might result in an increased labor supply.
Women are also likely to become affected by changes in the number of small children in a
household. In families with children below school age and in particular with infants women
and perhaps also men will decrease their labor supply. During a period of one and a half years
after a child is born one of the parents can stay at home with compensation from the social
security system. Likewise, when children grow up and start school parents might increase
their labor supply again. One variable (Chplus) indicates if the number of children below 7
years of age (school age) has increased in the period 1985-1992, and another variable
(Chminus) indicates if the number of children in this age range has decreased. The first
variable is expected to have a negative effect on labor supply and the second a positive. Age
differences are represented by two dummy variables. AGE30 takes the value one if the
respondent was at most 30 years old in 1985 and AGE50 takes the value one if the respondent
was older than 50 in 1985. The first of these dummy variables is expected to capture any
increases in labor supply when young people leave their education and training period and
enter the labor market more permanently. AGE50 will capture the rather frequent partial
withdrawal from the labor market a few years before normal retirement age. Early retirement
has become ever more common.
In the period analyzed the Swedish economy was exposed to major changes not directly
related to the tax reform. The financial markets became deregulated which resulted in a credit
expansion and an increased demand for credit financed real estate and consumer durables.
Real interest rates for a person who wanted to borrow money were negative until the
beginning of the 1990’s and then increased sharply. Inflation averaged almost 7 per cent 1985-
1991 with a peak close to 11 percent in 1990. In 1992 it dropped to about 2 per cent. The
financial crises of 1992 with increasing interest rates and a floating Swedish currency also had
a major impact on the real economy. The excess demand for labor at the end of the 1980’s and
beginning of the 1990’s in 1992 turned into an excess supply. The unemployment rate, which
was about 2.8 per cent in 1985, first decreased and then in 1992 almost doubled compared to
its 1985 level. It is obviously difficult to isolate the effects of the tax reforms from all other
changes, which also might have influenced hours of work. We try to capture the effect of
changes in the demand for labor by using regional changes in the unemployment rate.
4. A multivariate analysis to compensate for confounding effects.
If the tax payers had been exposed to a controlled random experiment we could
simply have computed the mean change in annual hours by suitable levels of change in the
marginal tax rate and compared. Because our data do not come from a controlled experiment9
we have to control for confounding factors, which will be done by a regression model, and
hope that any effects not controlled for are randomly allocated across the population. Our
situation is, however, even more complicated, because our ”design variable” is not exogenous
to the outcome of the experiment but depends on the 1985 work hours. We also have to deal
with measurement errors in the wage rate variable which might be correlated with our
outcome variable and with the possibility of sample selection because of nonresponse and
because some people choose not to work at all. These three problems will first be discussed
one by one.
To see that regressing the change in hours on the change in marginal tax rate at the 1985
observed hours might give spurious results, assume that the annual hours of market work are
determined by an optimizing behavior according to a conventional labor supply model and a
random error with zero expectation and independent of the optimal point. This implies that by
chance a number of individuals will work more hours than normal in 1985 and thus also get
unusually high incomes. For these individuals we will compute relatively large decreases in
marginal tax rates. In 1992 they would tend to return towards their normal (optimal) hours,
and we will thus observe a spurious positive correlation between the change in marginal tax
rates and in hours worked. If labor supply is influenced by transitory forces other than an
economic optimizing behavior subject to a budget constraint, here represented by a random
error, we will tend to underestimate the change in hours for those who experienced large
decreases in their marginal tax rates and overestimate the change in hours for those who
experienced small or no tax decreases. A small sampling experiment demonstrated that a
random error of this kind could produce insignificant effects of the tax decreases although
they by assumption would increase labor supply (Klevmarken et.al., 1995, Table 4.4). For this
reason the annual work hours in 1985 were instrumented by the respondents age in 1985, the
square and cube of the age variable, years of schooling, schooling squared, the interaction of
age and schooling, if the respondent lived in one of the big cities, the number of children less
than 7 years of age in 1985, incomes of capital 1985 and its square, the spouse’s labor and
capital incomes 1985, and the sum of not means tested transfer payments made to the
household. Separate regressions were run by gender and for married and singles, see Table
A1. The predicted annual hours were used to calculate a new estimate of labor income 1985
which jointly with observed incomes of capital etc. were used to compute ”instrumented”
estimates of the marginal tax rates with the 1985 and 1992 tax systems respectively. These
estimates were finally used to obtain new  ”instrumented” estimates of the change in the
marginal tax rate.
Table 3 shows average changes in work hours by the instrumented change in marginal tax rate
and by gender. The mean change for males ranges from a decrease of 132 hours for those who
did not get any tax cut to an increase of 105 for those who got a decrease by at least 20
percentage units. The difference-in-difference estimate is thus an increase in work hours of
327 hours for the latter group. However, if medians are used rather than means the effect is
zero. The effect of the tax decrease is stronger for females. For those who experienced a
decrease, which exceeded 20 percentage units the mean increase was 354 hours and the
median increase 155. For those who did not get any decrease in their marginal tax rates the
corresponding estimates are 43 hours and 0 hours. The difference-in difference estimates thus
become 311 hours and 155 hours. An increase of 311 hours corresponds to a relative increase
of as much as 23 per cent for the group of working women, which benefited most from the tax
changes. It remains to see if this strong effect is still present when the effects of all the other
variables have been separated out.10
The wage rate measures for 1985 and 1992 were obtained by dividing labor income with
annual hours of work. This implies that any measurement error in annual hours might render
inconsistent estimates of the wage rate effects (and all other effects). To deal with this
problem the log-change in the wage rate has been instrumented using as instruments the
respondents age in 1985, ditto squared and cubed, years of schooling in 1986 and ditto
squared, the survey based wage rates from 1986 and 1993, if the respondent lived in a big city
in 1986, if married or cohabiting, the number of children below the age of 7 in 1985 and ditto
in 1992, nonlabor income in 1985 and 1992 and the spouse’s nonlabor income 1985 and 1992.
(The estimates are given in Table A2.) Please note that the problem is measurement errors
primarily in hours worked and that there is no reason to believe that these errors are correlated
with the survey-based wage rate estimates for the succeeding years. These two variables are
thus valid instruments for this purpose.
It has already been noted that the panel is burdened by attrition and we will find that there are
partially missing observations which will decrease the effective sample size even further. This
reduction of the sample may well be nonrandom, a selectivity which need be tested and if
significant controlled for. Because the sample is limited to those who worked both in 1985
and in 1992 this is another possible source of selectivity, namely if the decision to work not is
independent of the process which determines how many hours someone will work if he works.
To control for these two sources of selectivity a probit was run and Heckman’s lambda
computed and added to the set of explanatory variables. The probit equation thus explained
the probability to contribute to the analysis given that the observation was part of the 1986
HUS wave. Any selectivity caused by a selective initial nonresponse in the 1986 wave is thus
not controlled for. The explanatory variables used in the probit was the respondent’s age in
1985 and ditto squared, if the respondent was married or cohabiting, years of schooling in
1986 and ditto squared, number of children in the household 1986, and the number of children
less than 7 years old, if the respondent lived in a big city 1986, and nonlabor income 1985.
The estimates were obtained separately for males and females and they are exhibited in Table
A3.
With the modifications explained above a regression model was estimated for the change in
annual work hours using Heckman’s two-step approach. The choice of functional forms in
modeling the effects of the design and control variables on the change in hours is open for
experimentation and a few alternative specifications have been tried. For instance, we tried
higher powers of the explanatory variables, a polynomial in the change of the marginal tax
rate and the dependent variable as the log-change rather than the change in hours.
4 A few
alternative definitions of the wage rate and income variables have also been tried. The main
results are rather robust relative to these changes in the specification. Table 4 gives the results
for a specification, which introduces the variables previously motivated linearly and also
nonlinearly when significant. The same model was estimated both with the change in hours
and with the log-change as dependent variable. In the choice between these two alternatives
some preference might be given to the first alternative because the distribution of hourly
changes satisfies the assumption of a normal distribution more closely than the distribution of
log-changes does, which has a high kurtosis (Table 2.). But it is also a matter of how one
prefers to interpret the results, in terms of hourly changes or relative changes.
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effective observations is so small that it is doubtful whether such an approach would give more useful results.11
The estimates of Table 4 show that the tax changes had a major impact on women’s work
hours. According to the change equation the point estimate for those who experienced a tax
decrease of at least 20 percentage units is as large as 436 hours which approximately
corresponds to a relative increase of more than 30 per cent! A 95 per cent confidence interval
ranges from 219 to 654 hours. Also women who got a smaller tax decrease increased their
hours but by less, for them a confidence interval ranges from 54 hours to 413 hours. The
corresponding estimates for men are about half the size of those for women, which implies
that only the effect for those who experienced large tax decreases is significantly different
from zero. As men on average work more than women the relative effect for men is even
smaller, about 10 per cent for the group with the largest tax decrease. The log-change equation
give estimates of relative effects, which are somewhat higher than those of the change
equation, but the qualitative conclusions are the same.
Wage rate changes have a significant effect on men’s work. Large increases increase hours
while small increases decrease them. For women there is no significant effect. Changes in
nonlabor income have no effect on work hours for either gender.  The effect of changes in
marital status is also insignificant.
It is conceivable that worker’s adjustment to new incentives are constrained by the employers
because jobs are only offered in certain packages, for instance, as full-time jobs of 40 hours
per week and because overtime is decided by the employer. To test the hypothesis that this
kind of constraints were important a dummy variable was added to the model. It indicated if
the respondent was permitted to work more hours if he (she) wanted. This variable was
available both from the 1986 and 1993 waves of data. The interaction between this variable
and the tax and wage rate variables were also tried, but none turned out significant (not shown
in Table 4).
When the number of preschool children increases women decrease their work effort
significantly. The point estimate shows an average decrease as large as 700 hours. There is no
corresponding effect for men. Using time-use data Flood(1990) and Carlin & Flood(1994)
found that not only women but also men decreased their labor supply when they had small
children. The difference in results is probably explained by the difference in definition of
hours worked and in measurement method used. In our case the definition of work includes
short leaves from work and if, for instance, a father stays at home for a day to attend to a sick
child it will not be registered in our data while it will in time-use data. Studies of the take up
of family benefits show that Swedish fathers frequently stay at home for a short period to
attend a child while the mother takes the responsibility for long periods of attendance, for
instance, after a child is born.
Those who are above the age of 50 significantly decrease their work hours independently of
other incentives. The relative effect of early (partial) retirement is about the same for males
and females, but because men on average work longer hours their decrease is larger measured
in hours. The point estimate is as large as a decrease of almost 400 hours with a 95 per cent
confidence interval ranging from -614 to -174 hours. There is no significant effect of being
young.
Changes in the unemployment rate had a significant effect on women but not on men. An
increase of the unemployment rate with 1 percentage unit decreased on average women’s12
labor supply by 91 hours. The corresponding confidence interval ranges from a decrease of 73
hours to a decrease of 175 hours. The point estimate of men is much smaller and also
insignificant. This is consistent with the notions that men still are more firmly attached to the
labor market than women and that the public sector, where many women are employed, for
the first time after World War II tried to reduce the number of its employees.
The message given by Table 4 with respect to the significance of Heckman’s lambda is
somewhat mixed. The change equation indicates a significant selectivity for males but not for
females, while the log-change equation shows a significant selectivity for females but not for
males! To investigate how sensitive our results are to Heckman’s compensation for selectivity
results are also presented without Heckman’s lambda but supplemented with a few diagnostic
tests (Table 5). These models were estimated by OLS.
The diagnostic tests obtained from the model for males (model M1) shows that there are
problems with this model. White’s test for heteroskedasticity rejects the hypothesis of
homoskedasticity, Ramsey’s RESET test also indicates that the model is badly specified, and
the residuals have a rather high kurtosis. As Heckman’s lambda is significant for this equation
selectivity could be the cause of these problems, but a closer analysis of the least-squares
residuals reveals that there are a few extreme observations with very large positive or negative
changes in work hours, and that there might be some kind of heterogeneity in behavior related
to age. For these reasons a model was estimated with interactions between the dummy
variable for people below 30 and the variables for changes in wage rates and marginal tax
rates, and with six extreme observations removed with work hours exceeding 1500 hours in
absolute change. The idea behind this specification is that young people are more mobile and
find it easier to adjust to changes in incentives. The results are presented in Table 5 (model
M2).
This revised model specification passes the diagnostic tests. It is true that the residual kurtosis
is to high to make the Jarque-Bera test not reject the hypothesis of normal residuals, but the
kurtosis is still rather mild and more importantly there is no skewness. The estimates now
reveal that most of the action takes place among those below 30 years of age. Young men
react more strongly negative to a small or moderate wage increase than middle aged and old
men do. Using the point estimates one finds that a one per cent real wage increase before tax
decreased the annual hours of work of young men by about 20 hours, but only by 6 hours for
older men. If the tax incentives were effective on men at all this effect was present only for
young men who got large marginal tax decreases. The point estimate is an increase of 400
hours but it is not well determined and barely significantly different from zero. All other
results are approximately the same as in the previous model specification. Although the new
model specification passes the diagnostic tests it does not exclude the presence of sample
selection selectivity. Indeed, as demonstrated in the second column of Table 4 Heckman’s
lambda comes out significant. The estimates of all other parameters are, however,
approximately the same as without correction for selectivity, and our conclusions about the
behavior of men holds.
For females the original model specification passes the diagnostic tests. (The Jarque-Bera test
of normality is an exception but this very mild deviation from a normal distribution is
innocent.) Because Heckman’s lambda was insignificant for females in this model one should
expect the OLS-estimates to be rather close to those obtained with Heckman’s two-step
method, which also is the case. A test of the same interaction terms, which were found13
important in the male equation, turned out nonsignificant. There is thus no indication that the
incentive effects are different for young women compared with older women. The wage rate
and income variables do not explain much of the behavior of women and a test of the
hypothesis that they have no effect cannot be rejected. Estimates with these two variables
deleted are given in the last column of Table 5. Because there is a rather high partial
nonresponse in the wage rate variable, dropping it implies that the effective sample size
increases by 56 per cent. These new results deviate in three respects from the old results.
There is no longer any significant effect of moderate decreases in the marginal tax rates. The
relatively large effect of high tax decreases remains however. The estimate of a return to more
work after the children have reached school age becomes stronger although still not fully
significant, and the negative effect on women’s work hours of an increase in the
unemployment rate drops and becomes insignificant.
There are previous results for Sweden, for instance in Aronsson & Palme (1994) which show
significant cross-price effects on the labor supply of two spouses. To test the presence of such
effects the spouse’s wage rate and tax dummies were added to the models of Table 5. The
sample was reduced to married and cohabiting couples. The point estimates were small and
insignificant. There was thus no indication of any cross effects in data, but with such small
sample insignificant estimates do not say much.
Most of the analysis in this paper has been limited to those who worked both in 1985 and
1992. It is a popular notion that decisions to enter the labor force is more sensitive to changes
in incentives than changes in hours among those who already are in the labor force.
Unfortunately the current data set does not permit a test of this notion. Table 1 confirms what
is already known from population statistics that the share of both men and women outside the
labor force is relatively small in Sweden. The number of individuals in the sample who did
not work at all in 1985 is too small for a meaningful analysis. Also the opposite transition, i.e.
out of  work, is difficult to analyze because of too small sample sizes. Partial nonresponse in
the wage rate and income variables makes it impossible to use these variables. Probit
estimates using the two tax dummy variables, the change in unemployment rates and a few
demographic variables are given in Table A4. The only variable which is significant for males
is the age variable demonstrating that men above 50 had a relative high probability to quit
working. The same is true for women who also had a high probability to stay at home if they
got (more) preschool children in their household. There is a weak indication that decreased
marginal taxes increased the probability to remain working.
5. Discussion and conclusion.
Contrary to the conclusions reached in Agell et.al.(1995) we have found that
women increased their hours of work more than men did. We have also found that only those
who experienced large tax decreases have increased their hours significantly. The estimates
for males are not as robust as those for women but if there is an effect also for men, then it is
primarily young men who have adjusted to the new tax incentives.
As noted in Agell et.al(1995) the confidence bands which usually hold for labor supply
elasticities in traditional models give widely different estimates of the increase in hours
resulting from tax decreases. Using a 95 per cent confidence interval of 0.1 - 0.27 for a wage
rate elasticity from Ackum Agell & Meghir (1995)  and the example of a relatively well paid14
white-collar worker who got an increase in his marginal income of 76 per cent, they point out
that it implies an increase in work hours from 14 to 370 hours in a year. Our point estimates
for women and young men who got large tax cuts approximately agree with the upper bound
of this interval. A 95 per cent confidence interval for these women ranges from 190 to 620
hours. In our sample about 25 per cent of all women belonged to this group.
Changes in the gross wage rate significantly influenced hours of work for men such that small
and moderate increases decreased hours of work while large increases were associated with
increases in hours. For women the wage rate effects were insignificant. It might be a little
strange that women would react strongly to tax changes but not to changes in their wage rates.
Most economists assume that behavioral adjustments depend on the net wage rate
independently of the source of change - the gross wage rate or the marginal tax rate. An
insignificant estimate, however, does not necessarily imply a zero effect, but rather a wide
confidence interval. Thus, we cannot exclude that women react to changes in the gross wage
rate although we cannot estimate such a behavior with good precision. It is interesting to note
though that the point estimate for women in Table 5 indicates a positive reaction to wage
increases.
Did the recession make it impossible to estimate any effects of the tax reform using data from
1992, a year just in the beginning of the recession, as some economists claim, for instance
Björklund (1995)? It is of course impossible to know if we have been able to control for all
important confounding variables. We have estimated a differential effect due to changes in the
marginal tax rates. To claim that we have underestimated the effects of the tax changes
because demand for labor dropped, one must argue that the decrease in demand primarily hit
those who got small tax changes, and that the small and insignificant estimates we have
obtained for this group thus primarily is the result of a decrease in the demand for them. It is
possible that there is some truth in this but if changes in demand were so important, one
would have expected the unemployment variable to come out much stronger than it did. It was
not at all significant for men, and significant in a few models for women but not in all. One
should also observe that the unemployment rate had not reached its peak in 1992. In any case,
this argument only implies that we have overestimated the difference in behavioral reaction
between those who got large tax cuts and those who got small, not that we have
underestimated the increase in hours for the first group.
Another and more valid objection is that we may not have observed and estimated all effects
on hours of work after such a short time. Behavioral adjustments to the major steps in the
reforms of 1990/91 might take longer than just a year. Although this may well be true our
analysis covers the adjustments during the whole seven year period 1985-1992 and this
objection does not diminish the significant effects we at least have found for women.15
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Table 1 Sample size by labor force participation 1985 and 1992 and by gender
Males
                                                              1992                                              All        
zero hours hours >0 missing
zero hours 4 22 35 61
6.56 36.07 57.38 100.00
1985 hours >0 40 559 455 1054
3.80 53.04 43.17 100.00
missing 1 16 15 32
3.13 50.00 46.88 100.00
All 45 597 505 1147
3.92 52.05 44.04 100.00
Females
                                                              1992                                              All        
zero hours hours >0  missing
zero hours 16 56 60 132
12.12 42.42 45.45 100.00
1985 hours >0 51 504 440 995
5.13 50.65 44.22 100.00
missing 24 14 40 78
30.77 17.95 51.28 100.00
All 91 574 540 1205
7.55 47.63 44.81 100.00
Note: Hours are annual hours. This table only applies to those who were below the age of 58 in 1985.
Italic numbers are row percentages.18
Table 2 Summary statistics for the change and log-change in annual hours of work and 
for the change in marginal tax rate
Changes in hours Log-change Change in marginal
in hours    tax rate (0/00)
     Males    Females    Males         Females Males       Females
Percentiles
10% -619.2 -774 -0.295 -0.592 -244 -251
25% -103.2 -103.2 -0.056 -0.051 -206 -206
50% 0.0 9.2 0.000 0.006 -167 -169
75% 206.4 557.8 0.095 0.409 -72 -63
90% 784.0 1084.0 0.398 1.099 -6 -23
Mean 46.3 168.9 0.039 0.159 -137 -139
Std.dev. 667.7 717.9 0.589 0.774 110 103
Skewness 0.44 -0.05 1.21 0.38 0.74 0.21
Kurtosis 6.78 3.65 20.86 8.77 7.86 4.50
Note:  Table applies to respondents who were below the age of 58 in 1985 and worked in both 
1985 and 1992.
The marginal tax rates were instrumented as explained in the main text.19
Table 3 Work hours in 1985, change in annual hours of work 1985-1992 and marginal
tax  rate in 1985, by gender and change in marginal tax rate.
Change in marginal tax rate
– -20                -20  – -7               -7 –
Males
Mean Hours of work 1985 1965 2107 2139
Change in hours of work 1985-1992
Mean 105 -47 -132
Median 0 0 0
Mean Marginal tax rate 1985 62.3 52.4 35.5
No. of observations 120 217 110
Females
Mean Hours of work 1985 1335 1509 1636
Change in hours of work 1985-1992
Mean 354 62 43
Median 155 0 0
Mean Marginal tax rate 1985 56.7 46.3 32.7
No. of observations 105 170 113
Note The sample is limited to those who worked in 1985 and 1992, were less than 58 years of age in 1985, and
had no missing values on the tax rate variables.
The marginal tax rates were instrumented as explained in the main text.20
Table 4 Heckman’s two-step estimates of change equations by gender
                 Change in hours    Log-change in hours
Males                                  Females       Males        Females 
Dlog(wage) -971.5 (2.35) -580.2 (2.13) -78.8 (0.32) -0.930 (1.90) -0.295 (1.03)
(Dlog(wage))
2  1033.7 (1.77) 1414.6 (2.55) 1199.8 (1.68) 0.998 (1.61) 0.839 (1.26
D(nonlabor inc) 3.0e-04(0.34) 4.8e-05 (0.08) 3.4e-04(0.62) 1.94e-07 (0.14) 3.11e-07 (0.50)
D1 222.9 (2.16) 21.8 (0.29) 436.6 (3.95) 0.231 (2.02) 0.484 (3.98)
D2 102.2 (1.35) 32.2 (0.52) 234.0 (2.57) 0.110 (1.80) 0.199 (2.49)
Separated 14.5 (0.19) -33.0 (0.52) -32.0 (0.33) 0.010 (0.13) -0.038 (0.44)
Chplus -30.7 (0.24) 50.4 (0.49) -704.8 (3.90) -0.077 (0.68) -0.666 (4.00)
Chminus 64.6 (1.00) 51.7 (0.95) 93.7 (1.09) 0.012 (0.22) 0.114 (1.21)
Age30 104.3 (1.02) 307.0 (1.51) -117.7 (0.92) 0.091 (0.92) -0.067 (0.52)
Age30*Dlog(wage) - -1283.2 (2.79) - - -
Age30*D1 - 421.2 (1.82) - - -
Age30*D2 - -89.0 (0.46) - - -
Age50 -394.3 (3.53) -318.6 (3.17) -204.9 (1.83) -0.282 (3.30) -0.263 (2.37)
D(unemp.rate) -1129.0 (0.37) -17.4 (0.01) -9104.4 (2.14) -1.345 (0.49) -9.73 (2.33)
l -357.1 (2.01) -286.7 (2.02) 248.4 (1.12) -0.241 (1.41) 0.483 (2.10)
Intercept 411.9 (2.00) 341.9 (2.05) -131.2 (0.46) 0.292 (1.21) -0.387 (1.34)
R
2 0.153 0.184 0.157 0.120 0.157
No of obs. 272 266 254 272 254
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis were based on White’s standard errors.21
Table 5 OLS-estimates of change equations by gender
                    Males                                   Females                          
Model  M1Model  M2 Model F1 Model F2
Dlog(wage) -1013.7 (3.52) -629.9 (2.52) 8.1 (0.03) -
(Dlog(wage))
2 1085.7 (2.00) 1534.4 (2.69) 1279.1 (1.97) -
D(nonlaborinc.) 6.5e-04 (1.11) 2.7e-04 (0.51) -31e-04 (0.51) -
D1 197.4 (2.18) -0.2 (0.00) 404.9 (3.76) 357.4 (3.87)
D2 74.7 (0.96) 6.7 (0.10) 213.0 (2.21) 35.8 (0.44)
Separated 5.4 (0.07) -40.0 (0.62) -38.9 (0.41) 59.8 (0.78)
Chplus -52.8 (0.47) 35.8 (0.38) 676.1 (4.08) -508.2 (3.75)
Chminus 85.3 (1.08) 67.9 (1.04) 81.5 (0.80) 147.7 (1.60)
Age30 38.6 (0.38) 271.2 (1.12) -72.1 (0.50) -89.5 (0.85)
Age30*Dlog(wage) - -1364.7 (2.63) - -
Age30*D1 - 407.8 (1.75) - -
Age30*D2 - -77.5 (0.39) - -
Age50 -441.2 (4.31) -355.7 (4.23) -146.2 (1.26) -312.1 (3.15)
D(unemp.rate) -1151.0 (0.33) 11.4 (0.00) -8690.1 (1.78) -3395.2 (0.81)
Intercept 21.1 (0.20) 27.2 (0.31) 167.7 (1.24) 145.1 (1.34)
R
2 0.140 0.172 0.152 0.124
No of obs. 272 266 254 396
Diagnostic tests
Residual skewness 0.32 -0.08 0.30 0.08
Residual kurtosis 6.75 4.59 3.57 3.72
P-values:
Jarque-Bera 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.011
White’s hetero- 0.007 0.119 0.187 0.164
skedasticity test
Ramsey’s RESET 0.003 0.501 0.611 0.722
test
Note:  The dependent variable is the change in annual hours of work
t-ratios in parenthesis
Six extreme values less than -1500 hours or more than +1500 were deleted when
Model M2 was estimatedFigure 1  Marginal tax rates 1985, 1990 and 1992 as a function of tax assessed income
Tax assesses income (1980 prices SEK)23
APPENDIX  Variable definitions and supplementary computations
Hours of work
Estimates of annual hours of work were obtained from the HUS event history files. These files
contain event history information, month by month, on the respondents labor market status
and average weekly working hours, if gainfully employed. To compute monthly estimates of
work hours the number of weeks per month was assumed to average 4.3.
In the 1986 supplementary sample there are no event history data. Respondents in the sample
were, however, asked retrospective questions concerning 1985, which gave us information on
the number of weeks they were engaged in various activities (summing to 52 weeks as a
consistency check) and the number of average weekly hours in full-time and part-time work.
Combining this information gave us a measure on annual working hours in 1985.
Unfortunately, there is no way to check if this way of estimating the annual hours of market
work gives the same result as the questions used to collect event history information would
have done.
All measures include hours in the main job and in any secondary job. They also include
periods of sickness, vacation and other leaves no longer than eight weeks.
Marginal taxes
For 1985 marginal tax rates were computed using an estimate of labor income as explained in
the main text, tax return data merged to the data base for each individual who had given
his/her consent (or equivalent data obtained form the respondent in a interview) and the 1985
tax system.
For 1992 the tax system of this year was applied to the 1985 incomes (including the estimated
income from work).  To make the 1992 tax system and the 1985 incomes compatible the
following definitions and adjustments were used:
Income from work (förvärvsinkomst) was defined as: (Income from employment)*k+(the sum
of incomes from farming and business)-general deduction-losses; where k is a factor used to
adjust for the increased tax bases in the 1992 tax system. k was assumed to depend on income in
the following way: k=1 in the first quartile of income from employment, k=1.02 for the second
quartile, k=1.04 for the third quartile and k=1.07 for the fourth. These factors (as well as the
factors m and n explained below) are ”guestimates” based on income comparisons from Statistic
Sweden.
Income from capital was defined as: (Income from capital in 1985)*m+(capital gains)*n-(deficit
from owner occupied home+imputed income from owner occupied home). m and n are factors
to adjust for the increased tax base for capital income tax. They were assumed to take the
following values:
Quartiles 1 2 3 4
m 1.0 1.19 1.38 1.57
n 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.224
Other deficits (övriga underskott i förvärvskälla) were not included.25
The following adjustments were made in the 1992 tax scales:
- Basic deductions (grundavdrag) and basic deductions for retired (särskilda grundavdrag för
pensionärer) were divided with 1.5 to take inflation into account.
- The kink point of the state tax 186600 was adjusted to 124400.
- The kink point 100000 in the computations of tax reductions caused by a deficit from income
of capital was reduced to 67000.
- The floor for taxable wealth was decreased from 800000 to 533000.
- The real estate tax was computed on the tax assessed values of 1985
The hourly wage rate
1985 and 1992
For these two years the hourly wage rate is estimated as the ratio of an estimate of labor income
over the estimate of annual hours of work. Labor income was defined as the sum of reported
cash earnings (kontant bruttolön) and taxable non-cash income (fri bil, bostad etc.)
1986 and 1993
Wage rates for 1986 and 1993 were estimated using the survey questions on pay combined with
the information on average weekly working hours at the time of the survey. The answers to the
survey questions could optionally be given as hourly, monthly, weekly, bi-weekly and even
annual earnings. To transform the answers into hourly earnings, we divided monthly earnings by
4.3*(normal weekly hours), and bi-weekly hours with twice the normal weekly hours. When
earnings were reported only as annual earnings, it was divided by 52 times the weekly hours.
The two estimates of the hourly wages differ. The wage rate defined as the ratio of labor income
and annual hours has both a higher mean and larger variability than the wage rate obtained
through the survey questions.
Nonlabor income
Nonlabor income includes income from capital, income from property other than farm property,
accrued capital gains and losses and less interest deductions and losses. In households with two
spouses their incomes were added . Added were also non-taxable scholarships, non-taxable
pensions and annuities, student grants, student loans, support payments received, other non-
taxable allowances, and subtracted were repayments of student loans, and support and periodic
assistance paid.
Unemployment rate
The regional unemployment rates used were defined by county (län) and obtained from the labor
force surveys. The unit of measurement is per mille.26
Table A1 Instrumentation of work hours 1985 by gender and marital status
Males Females
Married Cohabiting Married Cohabiting
or single or single
Age85 1.728 (0.03) -.311 (-0.00) -211.041 (-2.39) 432.663 (3.20)
Age
2 .418 (0.27) .737 (0.36) 4.594 (2.08) -12.002 (-3.29)
Age
3 -.0072 (-0.60) -.007 (-0.47) -0.332 (-1.90) .094 (3.06)
Sch86 -37.177 (-0.83) 356.573 (2.13) -43.212 (-0.46) -242.428 (-2.14)
Sch
2 .588 (0.52) -12.994 (-2.38) .826 (0.30) .913 (0.25)
AgeSch .252 (0.43) -.923 (-0.55) .813 (0.76) 3.814 (2.39)
Bigcty86 32.341 (0.82) 103.940 (1.16) 20.593 (0.32) 8.862 (0.08)
Nlinc -.004 (-4.01) -.004 (-1.02) -.008 (-3.00) -.005 (-0.66)
Nlinc
2 2.01e-08 (2.55) 5.01e-08 (0.38) 2.88e-08 (1.86) 3.05e-07 (0.95)
Trans .001 (0.23) -0.178 (-1.47) .004 (0.63) -.006 (-0.51)
Mnlinc .001 (0.84) - -0.001 (0.94) -
Minctj .000 (0.59) - -.0000 (-0.68) -
Child6 -32.669 (-1.16) -388.337 (-2.35) -133.024 (-2.66) -253.262 (-1.41)
Const 1978.39 (2.21) -788.115 (-0.48) 4616.739 (3.50) -1190.815 (0.65)
R
2 0.100 0.3397 0.0652 0.2387
No of obs 591 109 549 105
Notes:  OLS estimates, t-ratios in parenthesis27
Table A2 OLS-estimates of log-change wage rate equations, by gender
            Males                      Females      
Age1985 -0.0380 (0.98) -0.090 (2.38)
Ditto squared 0.0004 (0.92) 0.0010 (2.09)
Schooling 1986 -0.0011 (0.02) 0.0142 (0.17)
Ditto squared -0.0004 (0.15) -0.0006 (0.18)
Wage rate 1986 -0.3846 (2.12) -0.2072 (1.30)
Wage rate 1993 0.1608 (1.42) 0.2114 (2.05)
Bigcty 1986 -0.0597 (0.65) 0.0286 (0.29)
Married/cohabit 1986 -0.3475 (1.23) -0.1909 (0.40)
No of children <7 1985 -0.0326 (0.58) -0.0508 (0.74)
No of children < 7 1992 0.0026 (0.04) -0.2175 (2.36)
Nonlabor income1985 3.67e-06 (1.69) -3.51e-06 (0.97)
Nonlabor income1992 6.78e-07 (0.50) -1.92e-06 (0.55)
Spouse’s nonlabor income 1985 -673e.06 (1.46) -1.41e-06 (0.64)
Spouse’s nonlabor income 1992 3.29e-06 (0.60) 1.29e-06 (0.55)
Intercept 2.1509 (2.00) 2.0945 (1.92)
R
2 0.0788 0.0748
No of observations 273 261
Note: Dependent variable is the log-change 1985-1992 in deflated hourly wage rates. These rates were 
obtained as the ratio of annual earnings and annual hours adjusted for the difference in CPI. The 
explanatory variables wage rate 1986 and wage rate 1993 were responses to survey questions about 
wage rates in these two years. They were also adjusted for the change in CPI.
t-ratios in parenthesis.28
Table A3 Probit estimates of the probability to contribute to a change equation in work hours 
by gender
            Males                      Females      
Age 1985 0.083 (2.01) 0.180 (4.51)
Ditto squared -0.001 (1.76) -0.002 (4.15)
Married/cohabit 1986 0.172 (0.58) -0.205 (0.49)
Schooling 1986 0.244 (3.35) 0.230 (2.42)
Ditto squared -0.008 (2.95) -0.007 (1.79)
No of children 1986 0.056 (1.10) -0.150 (2.71)
Ditto < 7 in 1985 -0.034 (0.41) 0.108 (1.25)
Bigcty 1986 -0.086 (0.83) -0.334 (3.07)
Nonlabor income1985 -6.42e-06 (2.53) 3.033e-06 (1.04)
Intercept -3.922 (4.54) -5.529 (5.91)
Pseudo R
2 0.0378 0.048
No of observations 999 1058
Note: t-ratios in parenthesis29
Table A4 Estimates of probit models for the probability to remain working 1992
            Males                      Females      
D1 0.32 (1.24) 0.34 (1.43)
D2 0.32 (1.36) 0.46 (2.10)
Chplus - -1.19 (4.03)
Age30 -0.34 (1.16) 0.12 (0.42)
Age 50 -1.07 (4.89) -1.06 (4.78)
D(unemp. rate) -17.69 (1.50) -6.47 (0.57)
Intercept 1.94 (6.23) 1.60 (5.78)
Pseudo R
2 0.120 0.146
No of observations 432 429
Note: The analysis is limited to those who worked in 1985. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the 
respondent also worked in 1992.
t-ratios in parenthesis.